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CHAPTER III

CLAIMS CONCERNING LAWFUL AREAS OF
OPERATION: SUBMARINE OPERATIONAL AREAS
In times of relatively low coercion the high seas are an international
resource open to the peaceful uses of all states. The community policies
reflected in the legal doctrines of the law of the sea in time of peace are
designed to encourage the most comprehensive shared used and exploitation
of the high seas. 1 One of the principal uses of the sea has been described
by Admiral Mahan:
The first and most ol?vious light in which the sea presents itself
from the political and social point of view is that of a great highway;
or better, perhaps, of a wide common, over which men may pass in
all directions, but on which some well-worn paths show that controlling reasons have led them to choose certain lines of travel rather
others. 2
In times of relatively high coercion and violence the legal doctrines
permit belligerents to conduct hostilities upon the high seas which are the
same areas permitted to neutral states for trade and other uses. It is apparent that these conflicting uses in times usually called war will bring
about claims by belligerents against neutrals and by neutrals against belligerents. It is a principal purpose of the international law concerning high
seas operational areas to resolve these claims. Another principal purpose
of this branch of law is to resolve interbelligerent claims concerning the
use of high seas operational areas as a distinct method of conducting
hostilities.
It is well established doctrine that lawful naval combatant forces are
legally permitted to operate on the high seas as well as in the territorial
1
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waters and the internal waters of belligerents. 3 Such operations are forbidden in neutral territorial waters. 4 This prohibition is conditioned upon the
mutual observance of such neutral immunity by both naval belligerents. 5
The principal claims and controversies concerning areas of operation in
modern naval warfare, both between belligerents and neutrals and interbelligerent, have been connected with the lawfulness of operational areas
enforced, inter alia, by submarines, aircraft, and mines.
As employed by both sides during the World Wars, operational areas
were directed at the enemy belligerent and also at neutrals who traded
with the enemy. As to the enemy, the claim was to the employment of a
particularly severe method of naval warfare, frequently involving sinking
of all enemy vessels upon sight, within the specified area. As to neutrals,
the claim was to prevent neutral commerce with the enemy by excluding
neutral ships from the use of the operational area except use which is controlled by the claimant-belligerent. Operational areas enforced by submarines have been one of several methods of conducting economic warfare
against the enemy through control of the neutrals. 6

A. THE ECONOMIC WARFARE CONTEXT OF CLAIMS TO
ESTABLISH OPERATIONAL AREAS IN GENERAL WAR
SITUATIONS
Economic warfare is, of course, designed to have an adverse impact
upon the enemy belligerent. Neutral states constitute the vital external
source of supply for the enemy belligerent. Consequently, economic warfare measures directed against neutral states have an impact upon the
enemy belligerent. 7
The belligerent claim to control or prohibit economic intercourse with
the enemy involves the carrying out of three separate functions. The first
is the characterization of the goods to be prohibited or controlled and it
includes examining the relation of the goods to the military power of the
3
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enemy. 8 The traditional doctrines distinguishing between "free goods,"
"conditional contraband," and "absolute contraband" were designed to
facilitate this characterization. 9 "Free goods" were those deemed to be
incapable of military use. "Conditional contraband" covered goods which
could be used for military or civilian purposes and it was usually necessary
also to show their military destination before they could be controlled or
prohibited. "Absolute contraband" was limited to goods which were specialized for military uses. In a war situation in which major powers remain
neutral, it may be expected that belligerent characterization of goods will
take account of neutral interests in maintaining trade with the enemy
belligerent. In situations of general war, such as the two World Wars, the
contraband lists became more comprehensive as neutral interests and influence declined. 1~0 It is impossible to avoid the conclusion that belligerent
decisions in this field are determined in substantial part by neutral power
and purpose. 11
The second function is the actual stopping of the flow of neutral goods
imported by the enemy. 12 In addition, based upon the practice of the two
World Wars, it now involves stopping the flow of enemy exports to neutrals
as well. 13 The principal objective in stopping enemy exports has been to
prevent the enemy from earning foreign exchange credits. The range of
methods employed by belligerents to stop economic intercourse with the
enemy has been very great. Traditionally it involved visit and search 14
and capture of suspected individual vessels and the use of "close-in" naval
blockades. 15 In the World Wars it included the occasional use of the
methods just mentioned and also extended to "long-distance" naval blockades and high seas operational areas or "war zones" as well as to comprehensive administrative techniques of economic warfare 16 which changed
the locus of enforcement from the high seas to the docks.
The third function is the disposition of the goods and of the vessel or
8
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aircraft carrying them. 17 The extreme alternative courses of action are
release of the goods and craft on the one hand and destruction without
warning on the other. It is obviously in the interests of a belligerent capable of rational calculations of self-interest to condemn the goods and the
carrier and requisition them for his own purposes wherever possible. 18
The present chapter focuses upon the second of the above described
functions of economic warfare, stopping the flow of commerce between
neutrals and the enemy belligerent, and particularly upon submarine operational areas as a method of accomplishing this. It should be recognized
that all of the economic control methods, ranging from occasional visit
and search to submarine operational areas and comprehensive administrative techniques applied at the source, are but different methods of achieving the central objective of stopping neutral commerce with the enemy
belligerent which may benefit the latter. 19 In selecting particular methods
of economic control, a belligerent must take into account its economic and
military resources including the kind of naval power which it has. A
belligerent with predominantly surface naval power usually selects a
method of stopping commerce with the opposing belligerent which can be
made effective by surface naval power. In the same way, a belligerent
which does not command the surface of the sea but which has effective
submarine naval power, Germany being the obvious example, is compelled
to select a method of commerce interdiction which can be enforced by
submarine naval forces. 20
In selecting particular economic control methods there are certain traditional modes of stopping commerce with the enemy which must be
avoided by surface and submarine naval powers alike because of the
technical conditions of modern warfare. Specifically, the traditional procedures of visiting and searching a suspected merchant vessel on the high
seas are inconsistent with the elementary requirements of self-preservation
for both surface and submarine warships. 21 The surface warship which
attempts to follow these procedures becomes particularly vulnerable to
submarine and air attack. The submarine, during the World Wars, was
even more vulnerable to these types of attack. In addition, the submarine
which attempted to lower a boat for visit and search was vulnerable to
attack by ramming and gunfire from merchant ships.
17
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It is impossible to conduct anything but the most superficial search
of a large merchant vessel at sea whether the warship attempting to make
the search is a surface or submarine one. The surface naval powers, in
consequence, adopted the technique of diversion during the World Wars. 22
Under this technique a suspected merchant vessel was diverted to a designated control port where a comprehensive examination of the cargo
could be made. This technique was not available to a submarine naval
power since its exercise was dependent upon control of the surface of
the sea.
The time-honored "close-in" naval blockade involved the use of stationary or slowly cruising warships immediately off the coast of the
blockaded state. 23 This type of blockade was not employed by any naval
belligerent against any major enemy naval power during the World
Wars. 24 It is obvious that the blockading vessels would have been subjected to the same type of dangers involved in attempting to visit and
search. 25 In response to the dangers of employment of submarines, mines,
and aircraft, and to the requirements of effective economic warfare, the
surface naval powers employed the so-called "long-distance" blockade
against Germany. 26 The actual naval enforcement of the blockade against
Germany consisted of patrolling strategic high seas passages on the routes
to Germany at some distance from Germany itsel£. 27 In performing this
task the surface naval powers were in a position to rely primarily upon
surface rather than upon submarine warships. The surface warships were
usually supplemented by other means including mines and aircraft.
The long-distance blockade enforced in the manner described was
22
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a method of commerce interdiction which was not available to Germany
becau se of its lack of surface naval power. In response to the same realities
of modern nava l warfare which brought about the employment of the
long-distance blockade, Germany developed the operational area enforced
by submarines as its p reeminent method of interdicting commerce with
the United K ingdom. 2 8 For a time during the First World War, Germany
attempted to apply differential treatment to enemy and neutral merchant
ships in the p rescribed area. Only the enemy merchant ships were sunk
without warning an d, in theory at least, the neutrals were spared this fate. 29
Because of the tactical difficulty, and indeed impossibility in many situation s, of a submarine attempting to distinguish between neutral and enemy
merchant vessels, the attemp t was doomed to failure. Germany was presented with the dilemma whereby it either had to abandon submarine
enforcement of its areas for all ships or apply that enforcement to all ships
including neutrals. The German dilemma is reflected in the considerable
diplomatic correspondence between Germany and the United States while
the latter was a neutral. 30
The long-distance blockade was employed in both World Wars as a
p art of the comprehensive system of Allied economic warfare. The following conception of such economic warfare, with specific reference to the
Second World War, is provided by Professor Medlicott:
Economic warfa re is a military operation, comparable to the operations of the three Services in that its object is the defeat of the enemy,
and complementary to them in that its function is to deprive the enemy
of the material mean s of resistance. Bu t, unlike the operations of the
Armed Forces, its results a re secured not only by direct attack upon
the enemy but also by bringing p ressure to bear upon those neutral
countries from which the enemy draws his supplies. It must be distinguished from coercive m easures appropriate for adoption in peace
to settle international differences without recourse to war, e.g., sanctions, pacific blockade, economic reprisals, etc., since, unlike such
measures, it h as as its ultimate sanction the use of belligerent rights. 31
It should not be supposed that either the long-distance blockade or
comprehensive economic warfare was only a British concern. A study with
28
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specific reference to the First World War has described the role of the
United States:
[O]f all the nations engaged in the World War none was more ready to
make full use of its own economic power than the United States.
When the United States entered the war one of the first demands
which she made on Britain and the other allies was that they should
enforce a still more complete embargo on exports from their territories to doubtful destinations in Europe than they had previously
thought it necessary to impose, and she herself for many months stopped all exports whatsoever, both to the Scandinavian countries and
to Holland. She had made bitter complaints against the blacklisting
by the British government of German -firms in South and Central
America, but as soon as she entered the war she carried the blacklist
policy even farther on her own initiative. She has never admitted
complicity with the action of the British navy against neutral trade,
even after the American navy was patrolling the seas side by side
with the British navy, but in the use of the economic resources of the
allied and associated Powers as bargaining counters and as means of
bringing pressure to bear on neutral countries, she not only eagerly
accepted the position of an accomplice, but even took the lead in
giving this kind of economic weapon a keener edge and in wielding
it more effec_:tively. 32
Consistent with the comprehensive conception of economic warfare, it
is significant that the belligerent objective of completely interdicting commercial intercourse between the enemy belligerent and neutrals is now
widely accepted as lawful in general war. 33 This reflects the actual economic
warfare techniques of the World Wars and cha~ges the focus of legal analysis from the objective itself to the various methods of achieving it. In
particular, the legality of the operational area enforced by submarines h as
been questioned. The appraisal of such areas under law is made in the
balance of this chapter.

B. CLAIMS TO ESTABUSH SUBMARINE OPERATIONAL
AREAS IN GENERAL WAR SITUATIONS
The German claims are considered at the outset since they were first
in time and are of central importance for legal appraisal.
32
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I . German Claims
a. THE FIRST WORLD WAR
O n February 4, 1915 Germany proclaimed an "area of war" in the
waters su rrounding Great Britain and Ireland. 34 The Chancellor's Proclamation transmitted by the German Ambassador in Washington to the
U.S. Secretary of State invoked retaliation against Great Britain. 35 In
relevant part it provided :
Just as England h as designated the area between Scotland and
Norway as an area of war, so Germany now declares all the waters
surrounding Great Britain and I reland including the entire English
Channel as an area of war, and thus will proceed against the shipping
of the enemy.
For this purpose beginning February 18, 19 15 it will endeavor to destroy every enemy merchant ship that is found in this area of war without its always being possible to avert the peril, that thus threatens
persons and cargoes. Neutrals are therefore warned against further
entrusting crews, passengers and wares to such ships. Their attention
[is] also called to the fact, that it is advisable for their ships to avoid
entering this area, for even though the German naval forces have instructions to avoid violence to neutral ships in so far as they are recognizable, in view of the misuse of neutral flags ordered by the
British Government and the contingencies of naval warfare their becoming victims of torpedoes directed against enemy ships cannot always be avoided; at the same tim e it is specifically noted that shipping
north of Shetland Islands in the eastern area of the North Sea and in
a strip of at least thirty sea m iles in width along the Netherlands
coast is not imperiled. 36
It should be noted that submarine enforcement was not mentioned.
Since the German Navy lacked the power to provide enforcement by surface warships (except on an occasional basis), submarine enforcement
34
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was implicit. Further, the Proclamation was directed at "enemy" but not
at neutral merchant shipping and safe areas were designated for the
latter. 37 Because of the difficulties encountered by submarines in attempting to distinguish neutrals from belligerents, neutral merchant ships were
sunk- in the "area of war." Neutrals, particularly the United States, claimed
the illegality of the submarine operational area. This resulted in German
Government vacillation in the actual application of submarine enforcement in the area. 38
The British merchant vessel Lusitania (unarmed but carrying munitions
from the United States to the United Kingdom) was torpedoed in the
operational area on May 7, 1915 with considerable loss of American as
well as British lives. 39 There followed a year of claim and counterclaim
between the United States and Germany in 'which the United States maintained the position that nothing in the accepted principles of international
law or in any proper extension of them justified the sinking of belligerent
merchantmen transporting neutral passengers in the German operational
area. 40 The German Government's note of May 4, 1916 to the United
States stated:
In accordance with the general principles of visit and search and
destruction of merchant vessels recognized by international law, such
vessels, both within and without the area declared as naval war zone,
shall not be sunk without warning and without saving human lives,
unless these ships attempt to escape or offer resistance. 41

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

The German submarine forces have had, in fact, orders to conduct
submarine warfare in accordance with the general principles of visit
and search and destruction of merchant vessels as recognized by
international law, the sole exception being the conduct of warfare
against the enemy trade carried on enemy freight ships that are
encountered in the war zone surrounding Great Britain . . . . 42
This was nothing less than German agreement with the major contentions of the United States. Specifically, Germany conceded that even in
the "war zone" unarmed belligerent merchantmen with the sole exception
of cargo ships (as opposed to passenger ships) were to be accorded treatment by submarines in accordance with the traditional rules of international law regulating attack by surface warships. This amounted to a
37
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withdrawal of the German operational area claim of February 4, 1915
as to belligerent unarmed passenger vessels.
The termination of the German submarine operational area does not
necessarily lead to the conclusion that the German position was untenable
in law. Its significance was that Germany was not prepared to maintain
its legal position at the risk of war with the determined and powerful
neutral United States. 43 Even though Germany admitted its willingness
"to use the submarine weapon in strict conformity with the rules of international law as recognized before the outbreak of the war," the note specifically referred to the objective of the United States obtaining British
adherence to the traditional rules. The note concluded by stating that if
the United States were not successful in this objective, Germany "would
then be facing a new situation in which it must preserve [for] itself complete liberty of decision." 44 It is well known that the United States had
no more success in modifying the British long-distance naval blockade
after May 4, 1916 than it had achieved before then. The real issue confronted by the German decision-makers did not include the possibility of
modification of the increasingly successful British methods of economic
warfare. The central issue was whether Germany would abandon the use
of submarine operational area warfare or risk war with the United States. 45
It might have been militarily advantageous to Germany to make the decision in 1916 but it was nevertheless delayed until 1917.
The German "unrestricted" submarine warfare claim within a prescribed
operational "zone" was set forth in enclosures to a message of January 31,
1917 from the German Ambassador in Washington to the U.S. Secretary
of State:
Germany has, so far, not made unrestricted use of the weapon which
she possesses in her submarines. Since the Entente powers, however,
have made it impossible to come to an understanding based upon
equality of rights of all nations, as proposed by the Central powers,
and have instead declared only such a peace to be possible which shall
be dictated by the Entente allies and shall result in the destruction
43
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and humiliation of the Central powers, Germany is unable further
to forego the full use of her submarines ....
Under these circumstances Germany will meet the illegal measures of
her enemies by forcibly preventing after February 1, 1917, in a zone
around Great Britain, France, Italy, and in the eastern Mediterranean
all navigation, that of neutrals included, from and to England and
from and to France, etc., etc. [sic] All ships met within that zone will
be sunk. 46
This claim was expressly directed against neutrals as well as belligerents.
It specifically invoked submarine enforcement. American passenger ships
were permitted to sail once a week in each direction between the United
States and the United Kingdom proyided that the United States Government guaranteed that no contraband according to the German list was
carried. 47 Its juridical basis was not a claim of legal right but was rather
stated to be a legitimate reprisal measure based upon alleged British
violations of international law. It is well known that the present German
claim provided the ostensible basis for the participation of the United
States as a belligerent. 48
( 1) Appraisal as Reprisal

Initial appraisal should be made in terms of reprisal since it was
invoked. In addition, some writers regard reprisal as central to the legal
analysis of this subject. For example, Professor Tucker states:
[I]t does not appear possible to assert that-apart from reprisal-belligerents have at present the right to restrict the movement of neutral
vessels within vast tracts of the open seas merely by proclaiming that
these areas have been rendered dangerous-in one form or another-to neutral shipping. Hence, despite bellgerent [sic] practices
in two wars the establishment of war zones forms a lawful measure
only when taken in response to the persistent misconduct of an
enemy. 49
In typical formulation reprisals are acts of retaliation undertaken
through a course of conduct, otherwise unlawful, employed by one belligerent against the enemy belligerent for acts committed by the latter
contrary to the law of war. 50 The object of -reprisals is deemed to be
inducing the enemy to abandon its illegal methods of warfare. Appraisal
46

[1917] Foreign Rel. U.S. Supp. No.1 97, 100 (1931).
nld. at 102.
~ Beuhrig passim sets forth various bases including United States concern over a
possible German victory.
4
Tucker 305 (footnotes omitted).
50
Stone 353- 56; Oppenheim-Lauterpacht 561 - 63. See the text of Ch. I accompanying note 89.
4

!}

66
of reprisals in the present context must, therefore, consider the maJor
features of British naval warfare.
The United Kingdom armed its merchant ships and issued instructions
that they were to open fire upon German submarines. 51 These actions
could be regarded as violations of the traditional law which only permits
duly commissioned naval vessels to initiate attack. 52 It seems quite impossible to maintain that such British merchant ship departures from or
violations of the traditional law are valid while holding that German submarine departures from or violations of the same law are invalid. Consequently, sinking without further warning than that involved in notification of the operational area to British merchant ships may be justified as a
legitimate reprisal. It should be noted that the specific modality of the
reprisal, the submarine operational area, was directed particularly to these
British merchant ship violations of the traditionallaw. 53
It may be recalled that from a German perspective the British longdistance blockade was a "hunger blockade" since foodstuffs were not
allowed through it to Germany. 54 In the British view, the traditional law
required visit and search of m erchant ships by submarines in order to
protect "noncombatant" values. If this is accepted, it is difficult to avoid
the conclusion that the same law also required maintenance of the distinction between absolute and conditional contraband concerning the British
blockade, thus permitting food shipments to German "noncombatants." 55
It is concluded, therefore, that the actual British blockade methods also
51
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enormous pressure. We could not count on any help from the neutrals.
Germany's High Sea Fleet in the World War 219 (1920).
55
It was indeed upon the civilian population that the [blockade] action of the
Allies bore with the greatest weight; since Germany was able, thanks to her
•
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provided adequate justification for the submarine operational area as a
legitimate reprisal.
In addition, it should be remembered that the British employed "Qships" as a ruse of naval warfare designed to entrap and destroy submarines.56 These ships appeared to be innocent merchantmen but actually
were warships with substantial armament. The extent of the "warning"
they afforded to a submarine attempting to comply with the traditional
law is that the British naval ensign was hoisted simultaneously with opening fire. 57 The signifiance of the Q-ships is that they made it impossible
for submarines to attempt compliance with visit and search of merchant
ships without regard to whether a particular merchant ship appeared to
be armed or to have wireless equipment. If the Q-ships were a lawful ruse
of war, it also can be maintained p~rsuasively that the German use of a
submarine operational area was a lawful measure. If, on the other hand,
the employment of Q-ships was illegal, the submarine operational area
may be deemed a legitimate reprisal to it.
It should be mentioned that the British established the first modern
operational area, designating the entire North Sea as "a military area,"
on November 3, 1914. 58 The German operational area may be justified
as a legitimate reprisal to the British one. If the submarine operational
area as a legitimate reprisal measure could be properly invoked against
each of the particular British methods of naval war alone, it seems abundantly clear that it was justified by the combination of them.
Consideration should also be given to the validity of the German operational area as a reprisal affecting neutrals. The position of the United
States, while a neutral, was that interbelligerent reprisals could not affect
the rights of neutrals. 59 It is difficult to see how the United States could
energy and ingenuity, to keep her armies supplied with food and material up to
the armistice.
Guichard, The Naval Blockade 1914- 1918 304 (Turner transl. 1930).
56
Scheer, op. cit . supra note 54 at 262; Campbell, My Mystery Ships ( 1928);
R. W. Smith, "The Q-Ship-Cause and Effect," 79 Nav. Inst. Proc. 533 ( 1953).
57
"[Q-ships] were fitted with a very carefully concealed armament, which was kept
hidden until the submarine was within point-b lank range . . . . " Jellicoe, The Grand
Fleet 1914-1 91 6 262 ( 191 9 ) .
58
Supra note 35. Oppenheim-Lauterpacht 681-82, in attempting to distinguish
between the British and German a~eas, state:
In both cases neutral shipping suffered grievous hardship, but the British Government did at least indicate lanes through the mine-fields through which ships
might pass with safety . . . .
59
The United States note to Germany of July 21, 1915, for example, states:
If a belligerent cannot retaliate against an enemy without injuring [sic] the lives
of neutrals, as well as their property, humanity, as well as justice and a due
regard for the dignity of neutral powers, should dictate that the practice be
discontinued.
[1915] Foreign Rel. U.S. Supp. 480, 481 (1928). The German note to the United
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establish and expand a wartime trade with the United Kingdom which
supplied the latter with the sinews of war and expect at the same time to
be immune from German belligerent reprisals. 6 ° From the beginning of
the war the United States had protested but acquiesced in the British
long-distance blockade measures which effectively stopped its trade with
Germany. 61 In addition, the belligerent United States by laying the great
mine barrage between the Orkney Islands and the Norwegian coast during
the First World War, with its impact upon neutrals, may have changed
its earlier position. 62 It is concluded, consequently, that the actual impact
States of Feb. 16, 1916 indicates apparent agreement. In referring to the Lusitania
sinking, it states, "[T]he German retaliation affected neutrals which was not the
intention, as retaliation should be confined to enemy subjects." [ 1916] Foreign Rel.
U.S.Supp.171 (1929).
60
See notes 86, 8 7, infra.
61
The United States note to Great Britain of Dec. 26, 1914, for example, protested
against seizures and detentions of American cargoes destined to neutral European
ports. [1914] Foreign Rel. U.S. Supp. 372 ( 1928).
62
Because of its impact upon neutrals, the United States, with minimum consistency, could not and did not justify the barrage as a reprisal measure. The United
States note to Norway of Aug. 27, 1918 described the mine barrage as follows:
The Government of the United States is also advised that the Norwegian
Government has been informed that the Governments of the United States and
Great Britain are engaged in laying a barrage across that portion of the North
Sea lying between Scotland and Norway, which when completed will effectively
prevent the passage of enemy submarines to and from the Atlantic Ocean by
the northern route through the North Sea provided that they are not permitted
illegal passage through the territorial waters of Norway.
[1918] Foreign Rel. U.S. Supp. No.1 vol. 2, 1782, 1783 ( 1933).
Prof. Hyde has written:
Excuse for the belligerent achievement was seen in the fact that it proved to be
a vital and necessary means of safeguarding the shipping of the Allied and
Associated Powers from the dire consequences of illegal conduct of the enemy
persistently exemplied in the methods employed in submarine attacks. The laying of the barrage constituted a direct mode of combating a particular activity
of the enemy, and called for no invocation of the theory of retaliation as a prop
to support it in the face of neutral opposition.
Hyde 1945. This analysis supports the wisdom of the United States in not invoking
:r;etaliation although Prof. Hyde concedes that the mine barrage arose from the
"illegal conduct of the enemy." Apparently, if a belligerent does not invoke retalia•
tion, legal justification may be made without it.
Kenworthy & Young, Freedom of the Seas 97 (undated, circa 1928) after stating
that the U.S. Navy laid 57,000 moored mines while the British laid 13,000, continue:
And by rigidly restricting neutral merchant shipping to certain well-defined and
narrow channels they made the control of the sea-routes to Germany absolute.
From that time forward, no neutral merchant ship, even if she escaped bunker
control, black lists, export restrictions and search in harbours could, without an
Allied permit, hope to reach a port in a rationed neutral country. Which final
denial of all neutral rights at sea was another contribution of America.
Factual description appears in the U ~S. Office of Naval Records and Library, The
Northern Mine Barrage and Other Mining Activities ( 1920).
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of the German measures upon the United States and other neutrals cannot
deprive these measures of their status as legitimate reprisals.

(2) Appraisal as Claim of Right
Although upheld as a legitimate reprisal, it is necessary to appraise
the lawfulness of the submarine operations area apart from reprisal. Some
commentators have concluded that such areas are unlawful. For example,
Professor Garner has stated flatly:
As for the German war zone decree of January 1917, it was so flagrantly contrary to the laws of maritime warfare that nothing can
be said in defense of it. 63
Professor Tucker has stated similar views:
Even if completely effective in preventing all neutral traffic with an
enemy, and this possibility can no longer be excluded, the methods
that have characterized war zone, operations would not warrant
serious consideration in this respect, for the degree of effective danger
that is to attend the attempt to break blockade must be a lawful
danger. There is no basis for the belief that the requirement of effectiveness, demanded of lawful blockades, can be met simply by using
any means in order to render dangerous the passage of neutral vessels
through areas of the high seas declared to be blockaded. 64
In making such an appraisal, it is sometimes pointed out that new
weapons and methods of warfare (apparently meaning the submarine and
its use) do not bring about new rules of international law. 65 It is clear
63

1 Garner 354.
Tucker 298 (footnotes omitted).
Prof. Stone concludes that war zones on the high seas are lawful as between
belligerents. Stone 5 72. He does not reach a conclusion as to their lawfulness against
neutrals. I d. at 5 74.
Prof. Lauterpacht concludes that war zones are lawful as between belligerents
providing that the submarines used "comply with the laws of maritime warfare."
Oppenheim-Lauterpacht 682. In his view, the use of war zones as to neutrals "can
only be justified as a repri~al." I d. at 683-84.
Prof. Hyde states:
If, however, the belligerent can prove that its interference [through operational
areas] with the neutral is inconsequential in comparison with the advantage to
itself necessarily connected with the defense of its territory, the safety of which
is otherwise jeopardized, the excuse is entitled to respectful consideration.
3 Hyde 1949.
Prof. Keith reached a tentative wartime conclusion in 1944:
What is clear is that the change in the nature of naval weapons and methods of
warfare may compel revision of the issue of freedom of neutral navigation by
sea; as custom has recognized the right of blockade and of visit, search and
capture for carriage of contraband or the performance of unneutral service, so
it may authorize use of the conception of war zones.
2 Keith ( ed.) , Wheaton's International Law 346 (7th Eng. ed. 1944).
65
Colombos 467- 68; Higgins, Studies in International Law and Relations 294
(1928).
64
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that this is not an acceptable method of analysis unless novelty is to be
treated as illegality. It is also difficult to accept such an analysis in view
of the consistent historical record of acceptance of new methods and
instruments of war which are militarily efficient. 66
Professor Lauterpacht, after conceding that the long-distance surface
enforced blockade "could not be squared with the technical requirements
of the law of blockade as generally accepted," 67 has stated its juridical
basis:
[M]easures regularly and uniformly repeated in successive wars in the
form of reprisals and aiming at the economic isolation of the opposing
belligerent must be regarded as a development of the latent principle
of the law of blockade, namely, that the belligerent who possesses
the effective command of the sea is entitled to deprive his opponent
of the use thereof for the purpose either of navigation by his own
vessels or of conveying on neutral vessels such goods as are destined
to or originate from him. 68
It appears to be no more rational to determine the validity of measures
enforced by submarines according to the criteria applicable to surface
warships than to apply the exact criteria applicable to nineteenth-century
blockades to the modern "long-distance" ones with literally no variations
or considerations of "latent principle" permitted to accommodate technological changes.
Following the successful conclusion of the First World War by the Allied
powers, it was argued on the stated grounds of humanity that practically
all of the principal methods of the victors, including the long-distance
blockade, were illegal. 69 The argument emphasized the differences between
these methods and those employed during the previous century. It was
not emphasized, of course, that the nineteenth-century methods themselves
were an outgrowth and development of earlier methods. No attempt was
made to explain how or why the development and adaptation of the law
of naval warfare were irrevocably frozen in their nineteenth-century formulations. This type of argument, even assuming its acceptance after the
60

This historical record is examined in Royse 1-21 and passim.
Oppenheim-Lauterpacht 796.
68
I d. at 796-97.
69
Trimble, "Violations of Maritime Law by the Allied Powers during the World
War," 24 A.].I.L. 79 ( 1930).
It [the long-distance blockade] violated the three fundamentals of a blockade, as
was pointed out by the American Secretary of State, because it was not maintained at close range; it stopped vessels going to neutral ports; and it left the
German ports of the Baltic open to the Scandinavian countries, while they were
closed to other Powers.
Id. at 93 (footnote omitted.) These conclusions are supported by Baty, "Prize Law
and Modern Conditions," 25 A.].I.L. 625 ( 1931).
67
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war, had no impact on the decision-making process during the war. If the
argument had been accepted at that time, it seems most improbable that
it would have affected decision-makers· by compelling a reversion to the
naval methods of the previous century since those earlier methods were
no longer feasible from a technological standpoint. 70 The net effect of
reversion to the nineteenth-century methods would have been foregoing
the effective use of surface naval power, not to mention losing the war.
Because of this the almost certain outcome would have been that the
newer methods would have been continued under the onus of illegality.
The consequences would have been the enhancement of the attitude that
international law is inadequate to regulate modern war and an abandonment of all restraints upon naval warfare. Such a decision, or any functionally equivalent one to conduct war outside of law, would hardly
promote humanitarian objectives. Considering these factors, Professor Lauterpacht's appraisal of the long-distanc~. blockade is preferable. In addition,
a method of legal appraisal which proclaims illegality after the war but
which has no impact on decision-makers during the war leaves something
to be desired. 71 This difficulty persists, of course, whether such an inadequate appraisal is made concerning surface or submarine methods of
warfare.
If Germany had claimed to establish the submarine area as a matter
of legal right it could have advanced a number of specific arguments.
British economic warfare against Germany, enforced by surface naval
power, was an adaptation of the traditional principles of the law of war
to the changed circumstances of the First World War. In particular, the
long-distance blockade was a development of the traditional principles
and could not be regarded as lawful unless technological change were
accepted as fact and unless consequent doctrinal adaptation and extension
were accepted as an integral part of the law. 72
Employing precisely the same criteria, Germany could claim that its
submarine warfare was also an adaptation and extension of the traditional
principles. This claim, in substance, is analogous to Professor Lauterpacht's
·appraisal of the long-distance surface blockade quoted above. The summary way to reject it is to argue that the reasoning is inapplicable to
submarines. Mr. Colombos has stated:
[T]he attempt to change existjng principles to the advantage of the
70

See the text accompanying notes 23-2 7 supra.
It is obvious that the humanitarian objectives of the laws of war must be implemented during the actual war or hostilities.
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The lawfulness of the long-range blockade is upheld by Colombos 693- 94;
Oppenheim-Lauterpacht 796- 97; Garner, "Violations of Maritime Law by the
Allied Powers During the World War," 25 A.].I.L. 26, 42- 48 ( 1931) (emphasizing
geographical factors).
71
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party which lacks command of the surface of the sea is an attempt
to avoid the consequences of naval weakness. 73
In view of the military efficiency manifested by submarines in two World
Wars, one may doubt the accuracy of the label of "naval weakness." The
quoted writer has been equally explicit in summarizing modern economic
warfare enforced by surface vessels: "The economic weapon was thus
effectively used to throttle the enemy's commerce." 74 In the same context
of surface naval enforcement he states that, "The annihilation of the
enemy's commerce is one of the great aims of naval warfare." 75 The
contrast in such an appraisal of surface and submarine naval warfare
could lead an observer to suspect a bias against the latter without regard
to the relative destruction of values actually involved in its use.
It may be that operational areas, at least for individual submarines,
could be juridically upheld even by the same standards applicable to surface
warships. Dr. Royse, after examining the failure of the Hague Conventions
to restrict the efficient use of surface naval gunfire, states:
The warship, in a legal sense, thus became a floating battlefield
carrying with it the same immunity from restrictions as attended land
operations in the actual combat zone. The exclusive military sphere
characterizing land operations, in which the principle of utility or
effectiveness dominated, became similarly operative in any zone occupied by a belligerent naval vessel. This sphere may be said to have
followed the warship through all waters in all its war operations.
Whatever restrictions obtained were concerned, as in land operations,
with wanton destruction and terrorization. Effective artillery operations were left unrestricted. 76
It is not necessary, of course, to rely on this interesting analysis alone
because of the other considerations which indicate the juridical validity of
submarine operational areas.
It is sometimes stated that the vulnerability and other characteristics of
submarines do not reduce the obligation to comply with the traditional
doctrinal requirements. 77 It must be recalled that even the British, with
predominant surface naval power, were not able to comply with the traditional procedures of visit and search at sea. 78 It could be persuasively
maintained, in consequence, that these technologically obsolete procedures
were no more applicable to submarine warships. Before resorting to "unrestricted" submarine warfare in 1917, the argument would stress, Germany
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Colombos 470.
~ I d. at 707.
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I d. at 509-10.
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Royse 164 (footnote omitted).
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Colombos 469-70; 1· Garner 3 77-80.
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The technique of diversion of merchant ships was adopted because of the impracticability of visit and search at sea: See the text accompanying note 22 supra.
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actually attempted VISit and search by submarines and this was proven
unworkable in the light of the new technology in general and the methods
of warfare employed by British merchant ships in particular. 79
The relative destructiveness of particular methods of stopping commerce
with the enemy belligerent should be more important criteria to determine
lawfulness than compliance with obsolete procedures. 80 The intermediate
sanctioning devices employed for the long-distance blockade consisted of
the navicert system, diversion of ships to ports for adequate searches, compliance with bunker controls, and similar methods. 81 The ultimate sanction
applied to merchant vessels which failed to acquiesce in the intermediate
sanctions and persisted in attempting to run the blockade was gunfire from
surface naval vessels. 82 It is well established even under the traditional law
that a merchant vessel which refuses to stop when ordered to do so may be
attacked by a belligerent warship. 83 The refusal by a merchant ship to
comply with the warning involved in· a proclaimed submarine operational
area, in view of the changes in naval technology, may be said to be tantamount to persistent refusal to stop when ordered to do so by a surface
warship. In this context, there is no reason why torpedo attack without
further warning than that involved in a specified and notified operational
area should be regarded as more destructive of neutral human and material
values than gunfire from surface warships.
The German submarine operational area is also reasonable in other
respects. The notice concerning the area issued to neutral states enchanced
the military effectiveness of the area in interdicting commerical intercourse
between the United Kingdom and the neutrals. 84 At the same time the
notice was designated to minimize destruction of neutral values by encouraging or coercing the neutrals to keep their merchant ships out of the
operational area. The central importance of the economic objective in
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See the text accompanying notes 51, 56, and 57 supra.
See McDougal & Feliciano 494.
81
These sanctions were highly effective. 1 & 2 Medlicott passim.
82
This was the ultimate sanction even though the traditional texts only list capture
as a sanction for breach of blockade. See, e.g.~ Oppenh~im-Lauterpacht 788-89. The
same text reveals no hesitancy in allowing an attack on a merchant ship if the attack
is in response to a refusal to submit to visit. See infra note 83.
83
"Enemy merchantmen may be attacked only if they refuse to submit to visit
after having been duly signalled to do so." Oppenheim-Lauterpacht 466-67 (footnotes
omitted).
84
Compare the comprehensive character of commerce interdiction sanctioned by
surface naval power:
It is now not only a case of blockade, it is a case of shutting down German
commerce the world over, so far as we are able to do it.
De Montmorency, "The Black List," 3 Grotius Trans. 23, 34 ( 1917) .
80
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general war to both surface and submarine naval powers also supports
the conclusion of the reason~bleness of the submarine area. 85
Appraisal of the German submarine operations area as a claim of right
should also be made in terms of its impact upon neutrals. Although termed
"neutrals," it must be recalled that some neutrals, and particularly the
United States, were engaged in the large and profitable trade of supplying
war material to Germany's principal enemies but not to Germany. 86 In
view of the general character of the war situation and of the crucial importance of economic warfare, the belligerent interest in maintenance of
the operational area must be deemed to outweigh by far the neutral interest
in trade with one group of belligerents. The neutral interest thus overcome,
it should be emphasized, is not the mere maintenance of the former peacetime trade but rather the development of a greatly expanded wartime
trade. 87
For these further reasons, the German submarine operational area of the
First World War must be upheld as a lawful claim of right. In summary,
the outcome of the decision-making process in the First World War was
the development of expectations of uniformity and rightness of the kind
usually described as customary law. This customary law upholds as reasonable and lawful both the long-distance surface blockade and the submarine
operational area. It should be added that the interwar period produced
no international agreement specifically designed to outlaw submarine
operational areas.
85

"It would appear that recourse to this practice [submarine operational areas],
because of fundamental belligerent rights, cannot be opposed." Mori, The Submarine
in War: A Study of Relevant Rules and Problems 172 ( 1931).
86
From June 30, 1914, to June 30, 1917, the United States shipped $506,674,000
worth of gunpowder and $665,237,000 in other explosives.
Buehrig 89 (footnotes omitted). The quoted figures do not include firearms, cartridges, and various metals. Prof. Buehrig states that as to all of these (except copper277% increase):
[T]he increase over the three-year period 1911-13 was so extreme as to indicate
that before _the war the countries in question imported these commodities from
the United States in only negligible quantities.
Ibid.
87
If the neutrals had in reality been content to continue their normal peace- ·
time trade, many of the conflicts with the belligerents would not have taken
place and the law of neutrality might have been shaped quite differently.
Jessup, 4 Neutrality: Its History~ Economics and Law (val. 4 is additionally entitled
Today and Tomorrow) 23 ( 1936).
They have sought to grasp the momentary inflated profits of the war boom,
unwilling to hold themselves down to a normal economic life even in so far as
normality is possible under such circumstances. Their compaints, their quarrels
with the belligerents and their frequently resulting involvement in the war, have
resulted from their insistence upon entering the economic conflict.
!d. at 34.
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b. THE SECOND WORLD WAR
On November 24, 1939 the German Government made its first
submarine area claim of the new war in a note to several of the maritime
neutral states. 88 The note was not sent to the United States which barred
its citizens, ships, and aircraft from a combat zone which included a large
area off the European west coast. 89 The note pointed out the existence
of the United States combat zone as well as the alleged use of enemy
merchant ships for aggressive purposes and stated that these matters caused
the German Government:
to warn anew and more strongly that in view of the fact that the
actions are carried on with all the technical means of modern warfare, and in view of the fact that these actions are increasing in the
waters around the British Isles and near the French coast, these waters
can no longer be considered safe for neutral shipping. 90
Admiral Donitz's counsel, Flottenrichter Kranzbuhler, described the operational area and its effect to the International Military Tribunal as
follows:
The note then recommends as shipping lanes between neutral
powers certain sea routes which are not endangered by German naval
warfare and, furthermore, recommends legislative measures according
to the example set by the United States. In concluding, the Reich
Government rejects responsibility for any consequences which might
follow if warning and recommendation should not be complied with.
This note constituted the announcement of an operational area equivalent in size to the U.S.A. combat zone, with the specified limitation
that only in those sea zones which were actually endangered by actions
against the enemy consideration could no longer be given to neutral
shipping. 91
On August 17, 1940, following its victory over France and the low
countries, Germany made another operational area claim in a note to
neutrals not including the United States. 92 It was described by Kranzhubler as "a declaration in which the entire area of the U.S.A. combat
zone around England without any limitation was designated as an operational area." 93 It provided in part:
The German Government assumes no responsibility for damage
88

18 I.M.T. 327.
Authority· for the combat zone was provided in the Neutrality Act of 1939, 54
Stat. 4, 7 ( 1939). A chart depicting the United States zone is in 1 Medlicott 334.
The combat zone was a municipal measure applicable only to United States citizens,
vessels and aircraft.
90
18 I.M.T. 328.
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Ibid.
I d. at 328-29.
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Ibid.
92

76
to ships or injury to persons which may befall them in this area. 94
As the result of the developments which the war has taken during
the last weeks England has been brought into the center of the war
activities at sea and in the air. In the sea area surrounding the British
Isles constant war action is consequently from now on to be expected
which makes it impossible for merchant ships to pass through this
sea area without running serious risks. The entire sea area around the
British Isles has therefore become a combat zone. Every vessel which
passes through this area is exposed to destruction not only by mines
but also by other weapons. The German Government therefore most
urgently renews its warning to neutral shipping against passing
through the danger zone . . . .
Apparently this later German claim did not provide for safe shipping
routes between neutral states as the earlier one did.

Appraisal
It should be noted that the earlier claim of November 24, 1939
does not, in substance, go beyond that in the German "unrestricted"
submarine zone of February 1, 1917. 95 The factual conditions of the
naval war situation during the Second World War were basically similar
to those of the First World War and included another Allied longdistance blockade. The importance of the economic objective in general
war was not reduced. 96 The same legal analysis employed in appraisal of
the German claim of February 1, 1917 also justifies the conclusion of the
lawfulness of the present claim. The International Military Tribunal at
Nuremberg, however, reached a decision which is in significant part inconsistent with this conclusion. 97
Assuming that the claim of August 1 7, 1940 did not provide for safe
routes between neutrals for genuine interneutral trade and that it was
practicable to do this, it is concluded that the claim is not justified in
law in this respect. The issue as to whether or not it is consistent with
law to prevent neutral trade with the opposing belligerent by the use of a
submarine operational area has been considered in connection with the
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6 Hackworth 485-86; it is also quoted less fully and with slight variations in
wording in 18 I.M.T. 329.
"War zone" declarations enforced by either surface or submarine naval power are
collected in U.S. Naval War College, International Law Documents 1943 51-67
( 1945) and U.S. Naval War College, International Law Documents 1940 44-52
( 1942). What is apparently a German propaganda version of the claim quoted in
the text appears in id. at 46-50.
95
See the text at note 46 supra.
96
See generally 1 & 2 Medlicott.
tn I.M.T. 311-13.
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claim of February 1, 1917. 98 It will be considered further with the other
issues raised before the International Military Tribunal. 99
Admiral Donitz was indicted before the International Military Tribunal
for, inter alia, "waging unrestricted submarine warfare contrary to the
NavaL Protocol of 1936." 100 In support of this claim, the prosecution contended:
Nor need we take time to examine the astonishing proposition that
the sinking of neutral shipping was legalized by the process of making
a paper order excluding such neutral ships not from some definite
war zone over which Germany exercised control but from vast areas
of the seas. For there is one matter at least about which nobody
questions or puts questions to the law. 101
This statement reflects adequately the prosecution's view of operational
areas. In its opinion such areas Gould only be lawfully claimed by a
belligerent exercising effective "control.'' Since Germany did not meet this
requirement, in spite of highly effective and almost decisive submarine
enforcement of the area, one is led to conclude that only a surface naval
power could exercise "control" in this restricted sense. In substance the
prosecution submitted that the German claim, because based upon submarine control and enforcement, was only a "paper order" 102 and the
claim of its legality as to neutrals an "astonishing proposition."
It was argued in behalf of Admiral Donitz that consideration was extended to neutrals in the conduct of submarine warfare as long as it was
possible. 103 Article 74 of the German Prize Law of 1939 incorporated the
substance of the Protocol of 1936. 104 Flottenrichter Kranzbuhler emphasized that this Ordinance was carried out by German submarines for the
first few weeks of the war until the enemy made it impossible. In his
words:
Why was this practice not kept up? Because the conduct of the enemy
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See the text accompanying notes 86, 87 supra.
See the text accompanying notes 121-27 infra.
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1 I.M.T. 311.
The "Naval [or Submarine] Protocol of 1936" is the same as the Proces-Verbal of
1936 and both, in substance, are the same as art. 22 of the London Naval Treaty of
1930. See note 114 infra for full citation.
101
Stated by Sir Hartley Shawcross. 19 I.M.T. 469.
102
The "paper order" or ''paper blockade" terminology was used historically to
refer to a traditional blockade supported by insufficient naval power to meet the
requirement of effectiveness. See Hall, The Law of Naval Warfare 198-99 (2nd rev.
ed. 1921).
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18 I.M.T. 314, 326- 27.
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The German Prize Law Code of Aug. 28, 1939 art. 74 is quoted in 7 Hackworth
248.
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made such a procedure militarily impossible, and at the same time
created the legal prerequisites for it~ modification. 105
The claim of reprisal could, of course, be invoked again as it was in
the earlier general war. Because of British and American departures from
the strict interpretation of the traditional law 106 the German submarine
operational area may again be justified as a legitimate reprisal. It could
be argued in favor of such an approach that reprisals have actually been
used as a legislative device to bring the law up to date with modern
technological realities. 107 Because of the facility of successfully invoking
reprisals, however, a more fundamental appraisal should be made. In
addition, it is simply not credible that the militarily efficient use of modern
naval power, whether surface, submarine, or air, is entirely dependent
upon the commission of illegalities by the opposing belligerent. 108
At the time of the proclamation of the German submarine operational
area of August 17, 1940 the following facts confronted the German naval
command according to Kranz buhler:
( 1) A legal trade between the neutrals and the British Isles no
longer existed. On the grounds of the German answers to the British
stipulations concerning contraband goods and the British export
blockade, any trade to and from England was contraband trade and
therefore illegal from the point of view of international law.
(2) The neutrals in practice submitted to all British measures, even
when these measures were contrary to their own interests and their
own conception of legality.
( 3) Thus, the neutrals directly supported British warfare, for by
submitting to the British control system in their own country they
permitted the British Navy to economize considerably on fighting
forces which, according to the hitherto existing international law,
should have exercised trade control at sea and which were now available for other war tasks. 109
105

18 I.M.T. 314.
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The British Admiralty assumed effective control over British merchant shipping
on Aug. 26, 1939 just before the start of World War II. Roskill 35. By March 1941,
the Admiralty had overcome the initial shortage and fitted 3,434 merchant ships with
antisubmarine guns. Id. at 47.
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See McDougal & Feliciano 675.
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See the remarkable account of the background of the British Reprisals Order in
Council of Nov. 27, 1939 in 1 Medlicott 112-14. One may receive the impression
that the British urgent need for effective economic warfare was so great that if
reprisal were not available another ground would have been invoked. In addition,
the careful long-range planning of economic warfare between the World Wars indicated unequivocally that it was to be considerably more than an occasional reprisal
response to enemy illegality. 1 Medlicott 12-24.
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Because of these facts, in Kranzbuhler's view, there was no reason for
the German Government to give preference to the neutrals over German
military needs "in determining its operational area with a view to preventing illegal traffic from reaching England." 110 He also pointed out
that the neutral ships traveling to England, in spite of German warnings~
underwent a great risk for the purpose of earning a high profit. 111
The judgment of the Tribunal, after stating that it "is not prepared to
hold Donitz guilty for his conduct of submarine warfare against British
armed merchant ships," 112 continued:
However, the proclamation of operational zones and the sinking of
neutral merchant vessels which enter those zones presents a different
question. This practice was employed in the war of 1914-1918 by
Germany and adopted in retaliation by Great Britain. The Washington Conference of 1922, the London Naval Agreement of 1930, and
the Protocol of 1936 were entered i;nto with full knowledge that such
zones had been employed in the First World War. Yet the Protocol
made no exception for operational zones. The order of Donitz to sink
neutral ships without warning when found within these zones was,
therefore, in the opinion of the Tribunal, a violation of the Protocol. 113
The "Protocol of 1936" is, in substance, the same as article 22 of the
London Naval Treaty of 1930 and provides:
( 1) In their action with regard to merchant ships, submarines must
conform to the rules of international law to which surface vessels are
subject.
( 2) In particular, except in the case of persistent refusal to stop on
being duly summoned, or of active resistance to visit or search , a
warship, whether surface vessel or submarine, may not sink or render
incapable of navigation a merchant vessel without having first placed
passengers, crew and ship's papers in a place of safety. For this p urpose the ship's boats are not regarded as a place of safety u nless the
safety of the passengers and crew is assured, in the existing sea and
weather conditions, by the p roximity of land, or the presence of
another vessel which is in a position to take them on board. 114
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Ibid.
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llll 1 I .M .T . 312.
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Id . at 312- 13.
114
T he "Protocol of 1936" or the "Proces-Verbal Relating to the Rules of Submarine Warfare Set Forth in Part IV of the Treaty of London of April 22, 1930"
contains the identical rules set forth in the London Naval Treaty Part IV (art. 22)
and quoted in the text. Art. 23 of the London Naval Treaty provided, "Part IV
shall remain in force without limit of time" (the rest of the Treaty expired on Dec.
31, 1936). In the Proces-Verbal the parties to the London Naval Treaty invited
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The second paragraph of the Protocol states two exceptions to the rules:
"persistent refusal to stop on being duly summoned" and "active resistance
to visit or search." The Tribunal's conclusion that "the Protocol made no
exception for operational zones" necessarily involves the interpretation
that the stated exceptions precluded the existence of others, and that the
stated ones did not cover the situation of a submarine operational area
being the functional equivalent of the stated exceptions. The Tribunal's
conclusion appears to be an example of mechanical interpretation or
literalism. 115 There is no indication that the Tribunal gave careful consideration to the alternative interpretation that the Protocol was inapplicable in operational areas since there was no international agreement on
this subject. Such an interpretation was advanced by Kranzbuhler 116 and
it is at the very least as plausible as the interpretation selected by the
Tribunal. It is more plausible if the operational area is evaluated as too
important to be dealt with by implication.
The ambiguities of the Protocol suggest that its rational interpretation,
that is ascertaining the probable intended meaning of the parties based
on all relevant evidence, 117 is more difficult than the Tribunal seemed to
appreciate. Among the ambiguities are the term "merchant ships" in the
first paragraph and the term "a merchant vessel" in the second paragraph.118 The Tribunal interpreted these terms as excluding "British
armed merchant ships." 119 It recognized that the British Admiralty convoyed merchant ships and directed them to send position reports upon
sighting submarines, "thus integrating merchant vessels into the warning
other states to agree to Part IV (art. 22). Forty-nine states adhere to it including
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Soviet Union, United Kingdom, and United States.
Dept of State, Treaties in Force 292 ( 1966).
The London Naval Treaty Part IV (art. 22) is in 46 Stat. 2858, 2881-82 ( 1931);
2 Hackworth 691; 6 Hackworth 466.
The Proces-Verbal or Protocol of 1936 is in 31 A.].I.L. Supp. Official Docs. 137-39
( 193 7) ; 7 Hackworth 248.
115
The process of interpretation, rightly conceived, cannot be regarded as a
mere mechanical one of drawing inevitable meanings from the words in a text,
or of searching for and discovering some preexisting specific intention of the
parties with respect to every situation arising under a treaty.
Harvard Research, Treaties 946.
116
18 I.M.T. 330.
117
The Harvard Research, Treaties 93 7 (art. 19 (a)) employs interpretation in
the light of the general purpose to be served by the treaty. The Harvard Research
is quoted in relevant part in the text of Ch. IV, section B. The same approach to
interpretation appears in American Law Institute, Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States section 14 7 ( 1965).
118
Compare Prof. Morison who describes the Treaty as "perfectly explicit" in 1
History of the United States Naval Operations in World War II: The Battle of the
Atlantic 8 ( 194 7).
119
1 I.M.T. 312.
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network of naval intelligence." 120 The references to merchant ships in
the Protocol could, with consistency, have been interpreted as not applicable to any vessel including neutrals so integrated into the British warning
network.
The Tribunal, however, found Admiral Donitz guilty of a violation of
the Protocol in the sinking of "neutral merchant vessels" which entered
the submarine operational areas. 121 The term "neutral merchant vessels"
is more precise than the language concerning merchant vessels in the Protocol but it is not self-defining. The broad term "neutral merchant vesssels"
comprises at least two distinct categories. The first covers those which are
engaged in genuine interneutral trade and do not contribute to the economic war resources of the belligerents. The second consists of those neutral
vessels which, through acqui~sc~nce or coercion, participate in the navicert
system and the other modalities of the surface long-distance blockade. 122
Although the ambiguous term "neutral" covers both categories, it is
obvious that the functional economic differences between them are much
greater than any similarities. The category of neutral vessels possessing
British navicerts, 123 ship navicerts, 124 or ship warrants, 125 actively cooperated in British economic warfare measures. The real issue before the Tribunal, in view of the fundamental importance of naval economic warfare
in general war, was whether this second category of "neutrals" were so
functionally a part of British and Allied economic warfare that they could
lawfully be accorded the same treatment as that accorded to belligerent
merchant ships. The Tribunal's invocation of the ambiguity "neutral
merchant vessels" enabled it to avoid making the difficult analysis of this
fundamental issue.
Professor Medlicott has now provided the kind of factual material which
is relevant to resolving the issue:
120

m.
122

Ibid.
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Under questioning by the chief British prosecutor, Admiral Donitz used a land
warfare analogy in connection with such neutral vessels: "For instance, no consideration would be shown on land either to a neutral truck convoy bringing ammunition
or supplies to the enemy." 13 l.M.T. 365.
123
A navicert was a "commercial passport" issued by the British Government "in
respect of any consignment which did not appear liable to seizure as contraband."
1 Medlicott 94. See generally 7 Hackworth 212-17; Ritchie, The ((Navicert" System
During the World War ( 1938).
1
2i A ship navic~rt was issued when the entire cargo was covered by navicerts and
was "intended to minimize further the formalities of visit and search." 1 Medlicott
96-97.
125
The ship warrant was a document issued to each neutral ship whose owner
had given satisfactory undertakings to do what the British Government required.
The shipowner undertook to comply with economic-warfare regulations. . . .
1 Medlicott 442- 43.
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It must always be remembered that the ship-warrant system was of
importance not only for economic-warfare purposes, but also for the
securing of tonnage and for the furthering of other sides of Allied
shipping policy. 126
In view of the functional naval economic warfare equivalence of these
"neutral merch~nt vessels" with British merchant vessels, it is reasonable
and lawful to accord them the same treatment in submarine operational
areas which the Tribunal approved in the situation of British merchant
ships. This resolution of the issue is formulated in somewhat narrower
terms than a conclusion of Professor Lauterpacht concerning the same
general subject matter:
[T]he experience of the two World Wars has shown that that substantial aspect of the traditional law of neutrality which centres around
the neutral rights of commerce and intercourse generally has become
obsolete to a large extent. In modern war in which the military and
economic aspects of the national effort are inextricably interwoven,
the concessions which the belligerent is in the position to make to
neutral commerce are very narrowly circumscribed. 127
There is at least one other factor which should have led the Tribunal
to accept Kranzbuhler's interpretation of the Protocol. Deference to wellknown principles of criminal law due process would have required the
Tribunal to resolve the ambiguities of the Protocol in Admiral Donitz'
favor since it was applied to him as a criminal statute. 128
Since the Tribunal provided no reasoned basis, other than its improbable
interpretation of the Protocol, for its conclusion that the sinking of "neutral" merchant ships in the submarine enforced operational area was illegal,
a further inquiry should be made for possible reasons. In looking outside
the judgment itself, there is a significant colloquy between Lord Justice
Lawrence, the President, and Admiral Donitz' counsel.
THE PRESIDENT:

126

One minute. Dr. Kranzbuhler, does not the right

1 Medlicott 443.
It is not surprising that the view of the German Supreme Prize Tribunal was tha~:
[T]he introduction of ships' warrants is a measure of economic warfare, with
the express purpose of getting to the greatest extent under British control those
ships which were not yet in British hands.
The Ole Wegger, [1943-45] Annual Digest 532, 535 (No. 193).
127
Oppenheim-Lauterpacht 642. The passage quoted continues by stating that it
is difficult "to visualize the nature of the principle" involved.
128
[A criminal] statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in
terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its
meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due process
of law.
Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).
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to declare a certain zone as an operational zone depend upon the power
to enforce it?
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUHLER:
point-of your question.

I do not quite follow the

THE PRESIDEN'T: Well, your contention is, apparently, that any state
at war has a right to declare such an operational zone as it thinks right
and in accordance with its interest, and what I was asking you was whether
the right to declare an operational zone, if there is such a right, does not
depend upon the ability or power of the state declaring the zone to enforce
that zone, to prevent any ships coming into it without being either captured
or shot.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUHLER: I do not believe, Mr. President, that there exists agreement of expert opinion regarding that question.
In contrast to the blockade zone in a classical sense where full effect is
necessary, the operational zone only provides for practical endangering
through continuous combat actions. This practical threat was present in
the German operational zone in my opinion, and I refer in that connection
to the proclamation of President Roosevelt regarding the U.S.A. combat
zone, where the entering of that zone was prohibited, because as a result
of combat actions shipping must of necessity be continuously endangered.129
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THE PRESIDENT: Do you mean, then, that you are basing the power
of the state to declare a certain zone as an operational zone not upon the
power of the state to enforce its orders in that zone, but upon the possibility of danger in that zone?
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUHLER: Yes
THE PRESIDENT: You say it depends upon the possibility of danger
in the zone?
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUHLER: I would not say the possibility
of danger, Mr. President, but the probability of danger, and the impossibility for the belligerent to protect neutral shipping against this danger. 130
The President's view, as strongly suggested in his questions, is that the
power to legally establish an operational area is based upon the ability
"to enforce that zone." The questions directed to Kranzbuhler indicate
that the questioner did not believe that Germany had such power of
enforcement, or "control," as the prosecution put it. The questions, therefore, appear to indicate full judicial agreement with the prosecution claim
129
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at 333.
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that the legal requirements of enforcement or control could not be met
by "a paper order" and submarine enforcement. 131 Unfortunately, Kranzhubler did not respond to the express statements in the questions and
demonstrate their juridical inadequacy. Whether the quoted questions
actually reveal the reasoning which was persuasive to the Tribunal or not,
it is clear that the decision of the Tribunal is at least consistent with this
reasoning.

c. CLAIMS TO ESTABLISH RESCUE ZONES OF

IMMUNITY
Two of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 provide for the ad hoc
creation of hospital zones and localities of immunity in land warfare. 132
These humanitarian provisions are designed to protect the wounded and
the sick as well as civilian persons from some of the effects of war. There
appears to be no sufficient reason why analogous zones for rescue purposes
should not be established on the high seas in time of war.
As a mat~er of fact, a German U-boat captain and Admiral Donitz
did attempt to establish such a rescue zone during the Second World War.
Captain Roskill, the historian of the British Navy, has described the facts
as follows:
In September, 1942, a group of [four] U-boats and a 'milch cow'
(as the Germans called their supply submarines) arrived south of the
equator, and there on the 12th U.l56 sank the homeward-bound
troopship Laconia, which had 1,800 Italian prisoners on board. On
learning from survivors what he had done Hartenstein, the U-boat's
captain, sent a series of messages en clair calling for help in the rescue
work and promising immunity to ships sent to the scene, provided
that he himself was not attacked. 133
Captain Roskill has also stated that: "Donitz ordered other [U-]boats
to go to the rescue, and the Vichy Government was asked to send help
from Dakar." 134 The U -boats initiated and took the principal role in the
rescue operations including towing lifeboats toward the African coast, and
Vichy French warships joined in the rescue work. During the four days
involved in the rescue work the submarines were, of course, diverted fro!?
their normal wartime operations. The British Navy ordered two ships to
proceed to the scene and assist. Roskill's account continues:
All went well until the next afternoon [Sept. 16] when an American
Army aircraft from the newly established base on Ascension Island
131

See the text at supra note 101.
Convention Concerning Wounded and Sick in the Field, art. 23; Convention
Concerning Civilian Persons, art. 14.
133
Roskill 224.
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2 Roskill, The War at Sea 1939-1945: The Pe,riod of Balance 210-11 (1956).
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arrived, flew around the surfaced U -boats for about an hour, and
then attacked U.l56 with bombs. It is as impossible to justify that
act as it is difficult to explain why it was committed. 135
The Historical Division of the U.S. Air Force has stated concerning
this incident:
A summary of operations from Ascension Island states that on the
morning of 16 September 1942 a B-24 of the US Army Air Forces
sighted a submarine at 5 degrees South, 11 degrees 40 minutes West.
The sub, which was towing two life boats and was in the process of
picking up two more, was displaying a white flag with a red cross.
The sub did not show a national flag when challenged by the B-24.
The plane left the scene and contacted Ascension. Since no friendly
subs were known to be in the area, the plane was instructed to
attack. 136
In making an appraisal in 1960, Captain Roskill has written:
To-day two things seem clear. The first is that throughout the days
following the torpedoing of the troopship, Hartenstein and the other
U-boat captains involved behaved with marked humanity towards
the survivors, doing their utmost to rescue friends and foes alike; and
the second is that, on the Allied side, whoever sent the order to the
aircraft to bomb the U-boat committed a serious blunder. 137
It should be stated that the order to bomb the submarine was worse
than "a serious blunder." In addition, the aircraft commander who carried out the order must have known the actual facts after flying "around
the surfaced U -boats for about an hour," and been aware that the order
was not based on an accurate understanding of the situation.
Following the bombing incident, Admiral Donitz issued orders to the
submarines to stop the rescue attempt. 138 Had it not been for the bombing, the attempt to establish the rescue zone of immunity in an area large
enough to effectuate the rescue probably would have been successful. As
it was, many of the personnel of the Laconia, including Italian prisoners
of war and British passengers, were rescued because of the actions of
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Excerpt of letter from Historical Division, U.S.A.F. to Mr. David D. Lewis (Apr.
12, 1960). The excerpted letter appears as an enclosure to letter from Director, Research Studies Institute, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala., to President,
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Hartenstein and Donitz. 139 There can be no doubt but that the rescue
attempt was consistent with the highest humanitarian traditions even
though there is no indication that the International Military Tribunal
gave credit for it. Since a preeminent objective of the laws of war is to
prevent unnecessary loss of life, rescue zones of immunity on the high seas
should be honored and implemented by belligerent and neutral states alike
in future naval wars.

2. United Kingdom Claims
During the Second World War the United Kingdom usually enjoyed
surface naval predominance over Germany. Apparently Germany enjoyed
such surface naval predominanc~ in the Skagerrak and Kattegat at the
time of the invasion of Norway. Beginning on April 9, 1940 the British
Government removed the restrictions on its submarines concerning attacks
upon merchant ships east of eight degrees East. 140 On May 8, 1940 the
British First Lord of the Admiralty announced in the House of Commons:
Therefore we limited our operations in the Skagerrak to the submarines. In order to make this work as effective as possible, the usual
restrictions which v;e have imposed on the actions of our submarines
were relaxed. As I told the House, all German ships by day and all
ships by night were to be sunk as opportunity served. 141

Appraisal
It was highly unlikely that any neutral ships were sailing in the Skagerrak (Jutland) and Kattegat area at the time the British relaxed their
"usual restrictions" on submarine operations. Consequently, the issues
concerning neutral merchant vessels in the submarine area do not appear
to exist as a practical matter. Nevertheless, the phrase "all German ships
by day" indicates that the British undertook to discriminate between
German ships and others, presumably neutrals, in the area in the daylight
hours. The category "all German ships" presents no legal issues as to
German warships, including naval auxiliaries, since they may be sunk
lawfully without warning whether in or out of an operational area. It is
most probable that the German merchant ships in the category were
either armed or otherwise participating in the German naval war efforf.
The sinking of such ships without warning would be upheld as lawful
even according to the decision of the International Military Tribunal in
the case of Admiral Donitz. 142
139
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In spite of the high improbability of neutral ships in the British submarine operational area, the phrase "all ships by night" includes the claim
to sink neutral ships in the Skagerrak and Kattegat during the hours of
darkness. Based on its decision in the case of Admiral Donitz, the Tribunal
would deem this claim directed at neutrals to be unlawful. 143 It should be
appraised as lawful where the neutral ships were participating in German
economic warfare. The reasons for this conclusion have been stated in the
criticism of the decision concerning neutral ships participating in the opposing belligerent's economic warfare in the case of Admiral Donitz. 144 In
summary, the same legal appraisal which upheld the lawfulness of the
German submarine operational areas in both World Wars provides an
ample juridical basis for upholding the British claim in the Skagerrak
and Kattegat.

3. United States Claims
'

'

On December 7, 1941 the United States Chief of Naval Operations
sent a secret message to the Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet which
stated:
EXECUTE AGAINST JAPAN UNRESTRICTED AIR AND
SUBMARINE WARFARE. 145
The message made no specification of the extent of the operational area
in which "unrestricted" warfare was to take place but it is probable, in
view of the command held by the addressee and the actual practice, that
it was the Pacific Ocean areas. This interpretation is supported by answers
given by Admiral Nimitz on May 11, 1946 to interrogatories put to him on
behalf of Admiral Donitz at the request of the International Military
Tribunal at Nuremberg:

2. Q. Did the U.S.A. in her sea warfare against Japan announce
certain waters to be areas of operation, blockade, danger,
restriction, warning or the like?
143

ld. at 313.
See the text at notes 121-27 supra.
To criticize particular parts of the judgment of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg is not, of course, th_e same as making a sweeping attack on war
crimes trials in general. There is reason to believe that such trials incorporating
basic standards of fairness are better than possible alternative courses of action including executing the accused without trial. For an effective answer to recommendations to execqte accused personnel without trial see Jackson, "The United Nations
Organization and War Crimes Trials," 46 A.S.I.L. Proc. 196, 199-200 ( 1952).
145
The text of the message is taken from a photographic copy of the original. The
message was declassified on Dec. 2, 1960. It was also sent to other military addresses
in the Pacific and further stated: "CINCAF INFORM BRITISH AND DUTCH.
INFORM ARMY."
Since the message was secret it could not have notified neutrals of the submarine
opera tiona I area.
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A. Yes. For the purpose of command of operations against Japan
3. Q.

A.
4. Q.

A.

the Pacific Ocean areas were declared a theater of operations.
If yes, was it customary in such areas for submarines to attack
merchantmen without warning with the exception of her own
and those of her Allies?
Yes, with the exception of hospital ships and other vessels under
'safe conduct' voyages for humanitarian purposes.
Were you under orders to do so?
The Chief of Naval Operations on 7 December 1941 ordered
unrestricted submarine warfare against J apan. 146

Appraisal
One of the most obvious aspects of "the Pacific Ocean areas" is
their great geographical extent. Considering the factual characteristics of
the Pacific war, the area of the Pacific Ocean is not an unreasonable
extent for the United States submarine operational area. 147 It is therefore
not persuasive to argue that the United States operational area is illegal
because of its size.
In its judgment in the case of Admiral Donitz the International Military
Tribunal dealt with United Kingdom and United States submarine operational areas in the following paragraph:
In view of all of the facts proved and in particular of an order of
the British Admiralty announced on 8 May 1940, according to which
all vessels should be sunk at night in the Skagerrak, and the answocs
to interrogatories by Admiral Nimitz stating that unrestricted submarine warfare was carried on in the Pacific Ocean by the United
States from the first day that Nation entered the war, the sentence
of Donitz is not assessed on the ground of his breaches of the international law of submarine warfare. 148
In substance this is a holding that Admiral Donitz, although guilty of
violating the Protocol as to "neutral" vessels in operational areas, will not
be punished in this respect because of what the Tribunal supposed to be
similar submarine operational area warfare conducted by the United
Kingdom and the United States. 149
146

40 l.M.T. 108, 109 (Document Donitz-100); the same interrogation is read
into the record of the proceedings in 17 I.M.T. 378- 81.
147
It is easier, a fortiori, to uphold the reasonableness of the geographic extent of
the smaller German opera tiona! areas.
148
1 l.M.T. 313.
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The same conclusion is reached in Robertson, "Submarine Warfare," JAG]. 3, 8
(Nov. 1956). Compare Smith 212- 13:
The only inference which can be drawn from the passages quoted is that a war
crime ceases to be punishable if the defense can prove that similar action was
taken on the victorious side.
For a characterization of the Donitz judgment as "confused" see Johnson, Book
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As demonstrated above in appraisal of the German Second World War
claims, those claims, and the warfare conducted under them, extended to
the sinking of neutral merchant ships as well as enemy ones. It has also
been pointed out that British submarine warfare in the Skagerrak and
Kattegat did not extend to neutrals as a practical matter. In the same way,
the Pacific Ocean areas were not frequented by neutral shipping after
December 7, 1941. If there was a limited commerce conducted by neutral
Soviet Union vessels during the Pacific war, both Japan 150 and the United
States, the principal naval belligerents, were interested in avoiding attacks
upon such vessels. 151 In any event, it is clear that the United States "unrestricted submarine warfare" in the Pacific was conducted without neutral
involvement. 152 Consequently, United States submarine operational area
warfare in the Pacific does not raise issues concerning its legality as applied
to either genuine interneutral trade or to neutral vessels participating in
the enemy economic warfare.
Since no legal issue is presented by the application of the United States
submarine operational area to Japanese warships, it will be appraised as
applied to Japanese merchant ships. The Japanese merchant ships, like the
British, were armed, reported submarine sightings, and attempted to ram
or otherwise attack submarines. 153 In short, such merchant ships were
fur.ctionally incorporated into the Japanese naval forces. Consequently,
there can be no doubt but that these merchant ships were the lawful
objects of "unrestricted submarine warfare," that is, attack without warnReview, 27 Brit. Y.B.I.L. 508 ( 1950).
For the view that art. 22 of the London Naval Treaty ( 1930) is obsolete see Kerr,
"International Law and the Future of Submarine Warfare," 81 Nav. Inst. Proc.
1105 ( 1955)
150
Japanese submarine operational areas are not referred to in the judgment of
the International Military Tribunal for the Far East. There is a reference to the
alleged legality of attacking "unarmed enemy merchant ships" between Hawaii and
the U.S. west coast in the proceedings. F.E.I.M.T. Proc. 27,296 (twenty seven thousand two hundred ninety-six). Japanese submarine warfare is considered in Ch. IV
of the present study.
151
Possibly the small numbers of such vessels and the limited area traversed by
them on voyages in the North Pacific made this tactically feasible.
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A secret explanatory message of Dec. 22, 1941 from the U.S. Chief of Naval
Operations to the U.S. Special Naval Observer, London made no express claim concerning neutrals. It stated:
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UNRESTRICTED AIR AND SUBMARINE WARFARE AGAINST JAPAN
MEANS THAT SUBMARINES AND AIR MAY ATTACK ANY OBJECTIVE WHATSOEVER THAT IS JAPANESE OR IS CONTROLLED BY
JAPAN OR IS OPERATING FOR THE DIRECT BENEFIT BENEFIT (sic)
OF JAPAN.
Text from photographic copy of original which was declassified March 29, 1961.
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109- 10.
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ing within the operational area enforced by submarines. 154 These are the
principal reasons for the conclusion of the legality of the United States
submarine operational area in the Pacific.
The submarine operational area may also be appraised in terms of
reprisal. The message of December 7, 1941 contains no express indication
that the unrestricted submarine warfare was to be justified as reprisal
action. That Admiral Nimitz thought reprisal was the basis appears in his
answers to other questions of the Nuremberg interrogatories:
17. Q. Has any order of the U.S. Naval authorities mentioned in
the above questionnaire concerning the tactics of U.S. submarines toward Japanese merchantmen been based on the
grounds of reprisal? If yes, what orders?
A. The unrestricted submarine and air warfare ordered on 7
December 1941 resulted from the recognition of Japanese
tactics revealed on that date. No further orders to U.S. submarines concerning tactics toward Japanese mechantmen
throughout the war were based on reprisal, although specific
instances of Japanese submarines committing atrocities toward
U.S. merchant marine survivors became known and would
have justified such a course.
19. Q. On the basis of what Japanese tactics was the reprisal considered justified?
A. The unrestricted submarine and air warfare ordered by the
Chief of Naval Operations on 7 December 1941 was justified
by the Japanese attacks on that date on U.S. bases, and on
both armed and unarmed ships and nationals, without warning or declaration of war. 155
It is well known that the German claim to establish submarine operational areas in the First World War w~s based upon the argument of
legitimate reprisal as response to allegedly unlawful British naval warfare.
That claim has been upheld as valid in the present study .156 By the same
reasoning, it is clear that the present claim to a submarine operational
area could also be upheld as a legitimate reprisal in response to Japanese
violations of the traditional law. Aside from Admiral Nimitz' answers
~See

the U.S. Navy Dept. Press Release of Feb. 2, 1946 entitled, "United States
Submarine Contributions to Victory in the Pacific," pp. 13A-14, quoted in part in
Tucker 66, n. 47. The press release assumed incorrectly that the sinking of Japanese
merchant ships in the operational area was a violation of the London Naval Treaty,
art. 22.
If particular Japanese merchant ships, for example some deep-sea fishing boats,
were not participating in the naval war, such boats could not be sunk lawfully without
warning.
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quoted above, there is no indication that reprisal has been used to justify
the United States operational area.

4. Submarine Operational Areas in Future General War
The present analysis postulates a nonnuclear general war or, in the
alternative, a general war with only limited use of nuclear weapons for
tactical '}lurposes. 157 It is assumed that a central objective of the political
elites of states with the capability of conducting an all-out war of thermonuclear devastation is to avoid such a war. 158 In the type of general war
postulated, a war similar to the World Wars, it is realistic to expect claims
to establish submarine operational areas because some major states do not
have the capacity to conduct independent naval operations on the high
seas except through the extertsive use of submarines. 159
In proje~ting the future course of legal decision concerning submarine
operational areas in general war it is necessary to accord some significance
to the past course of decision. The course of decision in both World Wars,
although freqHently justified as reprisals, is actually a development of the
customary law. This development has resulted in the adaptation of the law
to permit the effective use of submarine operational areas as well as to
permit the effective use of surface naval power. It would be highly
unrealistic to conclude that the entire practice of naval warfare, both submarine and surface, in the two World Wars is comprised of merely temporary variations from the traditional law conditioned upon the existence
of illegality in the conduct of war by the opposing belligerent. 160 The
importance of the economic objective in generai war indicates that this
objective has been and will be energetically pursued in the future through
submarine as well as surface naval power. The wartime perspective is
reflected in Prime Minister Asquith's statement to the House of Commons
on March 1, 1915:
We are not going to allow our efforts ... to be strangled in a network
of juridical niceties. . . . Under existing conditions there is no form
of economic pressure to which we do not consider ourselves entitled to resort. 161
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Such use of nuclear weapons is considered in Brodie, Escalation and the Nuclear
Option ( 1966).
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See generally Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy ( 195 7).
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"Only [Soviet] submarine operations would be significant in the great oceans."
Garth off 215.
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As to the surface enforced long-distance blockade, its indispensability is indicated
in Prof. Medlicott's "assessment and perspective." 2 Medlicott 630- 61. As to the
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It has been stated that the inadequacy of the International Military
Tribunal's opinion in the case of Admiral Donitz is due in part to its apparent assumption that the claim to an operational area could only be
upheld through the existence of sufficient surface naval power to exercise
effective control. Consistent with this opinion, Mr. Colombos has, in
substance, characterized submarine naval power as "naval weakness." 162
The actual success of submarines in enforcing operational areas in the
World Wars does not support the charge of "naval weakness." Submarine
naval power is, of course, different from surface naval power in many
respects. Nevertheless, the high degree of effective control manifested in
submarine operational areas should not be rendered juridically inadequate
by simply testing it in terms of the method of control exercised by surface
naval power. Even if it should be concluded that submarines during the
World Wars did not achieve sufficient control, it is clear that contemporary nuclear-powered and nuclear-armed submarines could achieve a
much greater degree of control in the operational area.
The concept of "freedom of the seas" has not outlawed submarine
operational areas in past general wars. The best-known formulation of
this concept appears in the second of President Wilson's fourteen points:
Absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas, outside territorial
waters, alike in peace and in war, except as the seas may be closed
in whole or in part by international action for the enforcement of
international covenants. 163
It is not surprising that the British made a reservation to this point. 164
In attempting to reassure them and obtain their agreement, at least in
principle, President Wilson explained:
Blockade is one of the many things which will require immediate redefinition in view of the many new circumstances of warfare developed by this war. There is no danger of its being abolished. 165
The outcome of President Wilson's attempt to obtain international support for the freedom of the seas166 was that it was not included in the
Treaty of Versailles. The available evidence seems to indicate that con-

(footnote omitted) . President Seymour regarded Asquith's statement as going far_
"towards an admission of illegality." I d. at 40.
16
a Colombos 4 70. The sentence from which the quoted words are taken appears in
full in the text accompanying supra note 73.
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[1918] Foreign Rel. U.S. Supp. 1 val. 1, 15 ( 1933).
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I d. at 421-23.
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Id. at 428.
163
See the account of the attempt in Seymour, op. cit. supra note 161 at 381-89.
See also 2 Savage, Policy of the United States Toward Maritime Commerce in War
158-60 (Dept. of State, 1936).
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ceptions of the freedom of the seas will not outlaw submarine operational
areas in future general wars. 167
To the extent that general war including naval economic warfare is a
future possibility/ 68 claims to establish operational areas controlled and
enforced by nuclear-powered submarines may be expected. The claims
may be manifested in the actual conduct of operational area warfare, as
was done by the United States in the Second World War, rather than in
words. 169 It does not seem a realistic way of promoting human values,
particularly in the light of the two World Wars, to contend that this use
of an efficient military technique is unlawful. It is clear that such contentions have had little impact on the actual process of decision thus far.
In addition, it is of central importance that the destruction of human
and material values involved in the use of such operational areas is not
disproportionate to their military efficiency. Consequently, it appears that
the continued legality of this method of warfare is assured in general war.
Another general war based on the pattern of the two World Wars does
not, however, appear to be the most probable future type of war. 170

C. CLAIMS TO ESTABLISH SUBMARINE OPERATIONAL
AREAS IN LIMITED WAR SITUATIONS
Limited wars with major powers as the participants and those with
minor powers as the participants were referred to in Chapter I. The legality of submarine operational areas in each limited war category should be
appraised.

1. Claims by Major Powers in Limited War
It is clear that the coercive methods which are employed to achieve
the objectives of limited war must be limited. Assuming that the belligerents comprise major powers wih great military capabilities, each
must limit the extensity of the area it uses for coercive purposes. If this
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is not done, the result may be an extension of the area of war beyond that
consistent with the limited objectives of the war. 171
The submarine operational area has been employed historically as a
method of general war. The absence of claims to establish such areas
should be taken as one indication that the war is to be limited in this
respect. 172 It will be recalled that in general war situations, neutral interests in maintaining commerce with a belligerent were deemed to be of
lesser importance than the belligerent interest in employing the submarine
operational area. In limited war, the opposite result can be maintained
more plausibly. It would be surprising indeed if the objectives of the belligerents, limited by definition, were accorded precedence over the interests
of neutrals in maintaining commerce.
The experience in the Korean War supports this analysis. That war
manifested neither submarine operational areas nor other modern methods
of general war such as the long-distance surface blockade. 173 The United
States, in fact, maintained a traditional close-in naval blockade. 174
In summary, submarine operational areas will most probably not be
employed in limited wars between major powers because of the basic
inconsistency between submarine operational areas as employed in the
two World Wars and the objectives of limited war, rather than because
of an interpretation of the Submarine Protocol of 1936. 175 If such areas
should be employed at all they would be employed in a much more restricted manner than in the World Wars. This conclusion is also supported
by the primacy of neutral commercial interests over belligerent interests
in the context of limited war.

2. Claims by Minor Powers in Limited War
Some wars are limited in the sense that the belligerents are only
capable of limited military efforts. In this type of war it may be predicted
with some confidence that the interests of neutrals will be protected
through their power and influence as opposed to that of the belligerents.
The Nyon Agreement provides an illustration of this. 176 Anything except
restricted submarine operational areas will probably be denied to the belligerents of they cause substantial inconvenience, much less danger, to the
neutral states. It is unlikely that a minor belligerent would be permitted
171
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to disrupt world trade by the employment of submarine operational areas·
of the kind associated with general war. If minor belligerents should make
claims to establish such areas, stressing their military efficiency and necessity,~ the claims may well be outweighed by the claims of neutrals against
their use. 177 In addition, a minor belligerent would probably not have
sufficient submarine naval power to maintain a submarine operational
area effectively.

3. Claims to Establish Restricted "Operational Areas"
A careful legal appraisal should avoid automatically ruling out the
drastically restricted use of naval power either in limited war or in coercive situations short of limited war. 178 Whether it is termed "limited naval
blockade," "quarantine-interdiction," some kind of "operational area," or
given another label, one should be slow to condemn as illegal such limited
measures especially when they are u~d to maintain world public order. 179
This is particularly true where the principal alternatives may be the use
of much more coercion including weapons of mass destruction. Whether
or not submarines are employed in such uses of naval power including
restricted "operational areas" would appear to make but little difference
in a legal appraisal.
In describing the use of coercion in the United States quarantine-interdiction of Soviet Union missiles to Cuba in 1962, the present writer has
stated:
[T]he formulation and implementation of the naval quarantineinterdiction amounted to the least possible use of the military instrument. Any lesser use would have amounted to abandonment of the
military instrument and exclusive reliance upon non-coercive procedures which most certainly would have been ineffective without
supporting military power. 1 8 0
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even in general war.
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an unpersuasive recommendatio n of the establishment of submarine defense identification zo nes (by supposed analogy to the U .S. Air Defense Identification Z on es )
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This is an example of the kind of coercion which should not be condemned without consideration of the alternatives in the factual situation
including the effects of other coercive methods as well as the effects of the
abandonment of all coercion. 181
181

Some apparently would not agree with the textual statement. See e.g. Wright,
" The Cuban Quarantine," 57 A.].I.L. 546 ( 1963). Prof. Wright's legal analysis
appears to be based upon the factual conclusion that the missiles involved only a
commercial transaction in time of peace.
""'
It is difficult to find that the Soviet Union violated any obligation of international law in shipping missiles to, and installing them in, Cuba, at the request
of the Castro government. Under general international law, states are free to
engage in trade in any articles whatever in time of peace.
I d. at 548-49 (footnote omitted).

